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Improved Summation from Shuffling
Borja Balle∗ James Bell† Adria Gascon‡ Kobbi Nissim§
Abstract
A protocol by Ishai et al. (FOCS 2006) showing how to implement distributed n-party sum-
mation from secure shuffling has regained relevance in the context of the recently proposed shuffle
model of differential privacy, as it allows to attain the accuracy levels of the curator model at a
moderate communication cost. To achieve statistical security 2−σ, the protocol by Ishai et al. re-
quires the number of messages sent by each party to grow logarithmically with n as O(log n + σ).
In this note we give an improved analysis achieving a dependency of the form O(1 + σ/ log n).
Conceptually, this addresses the intuitive question left open by Ishai et al. of whether the shuffling
step in their protocol provides a “hiding in the crowd” amplification effect as n increases. From
a practical perspective, our analysis provides explicit constants and shows, for example, that the
method of Ishai et al. applied to summation of 32-bit numbers from n = 104 parties sending 12
messages each provides statistical security 2−40.
1 Introduction
Ishai et al. [6] showed how to use anonymous communications as a building block for a variety of tasks,
including secure computation of n-party summation. In the setting of Ishai et al., n ≥ 2 users hold
values x1, . . . , xn in Zm and wish to reveal to a server the sum of their values (and nothing else) by
simultaneously sending anonymous messages to the server. A naive solution would require each user i to
anonymously send xi messages to the server, which then counts the total number of received messages.
The solution by Ishai et al. is much more efficient: each user i splits their input xi into k additive shares,
and sends all shares anonymously to the server. The server then obtains nk shares and reconstructs
the result by adding them up. Surprisingly, it is shown in [6] that k = O(logm + σ + logn) (see [1]
for explicit, small constants) suffices to achieve statistical security σ, in the sense that the server the
set of shares submitted by the users cannot distinguish two inputs (x1, . . . , xn) and (y1, . . . , yn) with∑
i xi =
∑
i yi, except with advantage 2
−σ. We refer informally to the protocol from Ishai et al. as the
IKOS protocol.
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The work of Ishai et al. is of significant relevance in the context of the recently proposed shuffle
model of Differential Privacy (DP) [2] (see also [4, 3]). In this model, a trusted shuffler applies a random
permutation to messages sent by users before these are received by a server. Note that this setting is
essentially the same as the one of Ishai et al., as the shuffler provides an anonymous communication
channel. This connection has been shown recently in independent works by Balle et al. [1] and Ghazi
et al. [5] which, by a black-box application of the IKOS protocol, showed that in the shuffle model one
can achieve the same accuracy/privacy trade-offs than in the central model of DP for the task of real
summation. Crucially, this can be done while only requiring O(logn) messages per party, and this is
enabled by the IKOS protocol. In fact, Ghazi et al. [5] had reinvented the protocol specifically for this
application. These results improve on previous work by Cheu et al. [3], where it was shown that the
same goal can be achieved with O(
√
n) messages per party.
An intriguing question was left open in the work of Ishai et al.: while the IKOS protocol works for
every number of users n ≥ 2, one could hope to improve the dependency of the number of required
messages on n. Intuitively, a larger number of participants should allow a single user i’s contribution
to “hide in the crowd” hence enabling splitting xi into a number of shares that does not increase with
n. This question is of special relevance in the context of applications to the shuffle model of differential
privacy, as a relatively large n is required due to privacy-accuracy tradeoffs.
In this paper we resolve the above question positively, showing that larger n does indeed help to
reduce the number of required messages. Concretely, we show that for fixed n,m and security parameter
σ, it suffices to take the number of shares to be k =
⌈
2σ+log2(m)
log2(n)−log2(e)
+ 2
⌉
. In particular, for securely
computing, with security σ = 40, the sum of 32-bit numbers by n = 104 users, our bounds show that
12 messages per party are enough. Furthermore, one of these messages can be sent in the clear.
We recently learned that Ghazi, Manurangsi, Pagh, and Velingker have, independently of our work,
obtained an analysis of the IKOS protocol that provides guarantees for a constant number of messages
but we are unaware of the specifics.
2 Preliminaries
We will denote the additive group that we wish to sum in by G. This group was taken to be Zm
in the example in the introduction but is only required to be an abelian group of size m. As in the
introduction we have n users each holding a private value xi ∈ G and we denote the tuple of these
values as ~x = (x1, . . . , xn). We denote random variables by upper case letters X,Y, . . . and tuples of
them ~X, ~Y, . . .. We denote randomized maps R,S, . . ..
For k ≥ 2 and x ∈ G we define the k-additive sharing of x as the output of the randomized map
Rk : G → Gk given by Rk(x) = (Y(1), . . . ,Y(k)), where Y(j), j ∈ [k], is a tuple of uniformly random
group elements (i.e. shares) conditioned on
∑
j Y
(j) = x.
We use the notation P for probability, E for expectation, V for variance, and TV for total variation
distance.
3 Our results
We define the k-parallel IKOS protocol with n users as the randomized map Vk,n : Gn → (Gn)k obtained
as follows. Let S(j) : Gn → Gn, j ∈ [k], be k independent shufflers returning a uniform random
permutation of their inputs. For any ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Gn define the random variables (Y(1)i , . . . ,Y(k)i ) =
Rk(xi), i ∈ [n]. Then, the IKOS protocol returns, for j ∈ [k], the result of independently shuffling the
2
jth shares of all the users together:
Vk,n(~x) =
(
S(1)(Y(1)1 , . . . ,Y(1)n ), . . . ,S(j)(Y(j)1 , . . . ,Y(j)n ), . . . ,S(k)(Y(k)1 , . . . ,Y(k)n )
)
(1)
Whenever n or k (or both) are clear from the context we omit them to unclutter our notation.
The IKOS protocol provides a method to compute the sum of the users’ inputs
∑
i∈[n] xi by summing
all the group elements in the result Vk,n(~x) ∈ (Gn)k. This follows from observing that such sum is just
a sum of the shares of every user. We define the statistical security of the parallel IKOS protocol in
the standard way. That is, we require the output distributions to be indistinguishable whenever the
protocol is executed on two inputs ~x, ~x′ ∈ Gn such that ∑i xi =∑i x′i. As usual, indistinguishability is
measured in terms of total variation (i.e. statistical) distance.
This is made precise in the following definitions, where we consider the cases with both fixed and
random inputs:
1. We say that a protocol V provides worst-case statistical security with parameter σ if for any
~x, ~x′ ∈ Gn, such that ∑i∈[n] xi =∑i∈[n] x′i, we have TV(V(~x),V(~x′)) ≤ 2−σ.
2. We say that a protocol V provides average-case statistical security with parameter σ if we have
E~X,~X′[TV|~X,~X′(V(~X),V(~X′))] ≤ 2−σ, where ~X and ~X′ are n-tuples of uniform random elements from
G conditioned on
∑
i∈[n] Xi =
∑
i∈[n] X
′
i.
The following theorem states our main technical result.
Theorem 3.1 (Average-case security). The k-parallel IKOS protocol with k ≥ 3 and n ≥ 19 users
provides average-case statistical security with distance 2−σ, for
σ =
(k − 1)(log2(n)− log2(e))− log2(m)
2
(2)
provided σ ≥ 1.
While the above theorem only states average-case security, a simple randomization trick recovers
worst-case security at the cost of one extra message per party. Moreover, such a message does not
need to be shuffled. This corresponds to a small variation on the parallel IKOS protocol where one of
the messages contributed by each user is not sent through a shuffler; i.e. it is possible to unequivocally
associate one of the messages from the input to each user. We define the k-parallel IKOS with randomized
inputs protocol as the randomized map Vk,n : Gn → (Gn)k+1 obtained as follows. Let S(j) : Gn → Gn,
j ∈ [k], be k independent shufflers returning a uniform random permutation of their inputs. For any
~x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Gn define the random variables (Y(1)i , . . . ,Y(k+1)i ) = Rk+1(xi), i ∈ [n], obtained by
sampling k+1 additive shares for each input. Then, the IKOS with randomized inputs protocol returns,
for j ∈ [k], the result of independently shuffling the jth shares of all the users together, concatenated
with the k + 1th unshuffled shares:
V˜k,n(~x) =
(
S(1)(Y(1)1 , . . . ,Y(1)n ), . . . ,S(j)(Y(j)1 , . . . ,Y(j)n ), . . . ,S(k)(Y(k)1 , . . . ,Y(k)n ), (Y(k+1)1 , . . . ,Y(k+1)n )
)
.
(3)
Corollary 3.1. The k-parallel IKOS with randomized inputs protocol with k ≥ 3 and n ≥ 19 users
provides worst-case statistical security with distance 2−σ, with σ given by the same expression as in
Theorem 3.1. Thus, for fixed n,m and σ, it suffices, for worst-case security, to take the number of
shuffled messages to be
k =
⌈
2σ + log2(m)
log2(n)− log2(e)
+ 1
⌉
. (4)
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Using the analysis in [1], k is required to be at least 2σ and then grows with n and m, so is not
constant in n and for σ = 40 is always at least 80. In this work the 2σ and the log(m) are divided by a
logarithmic factor of n. Thus, for fixed σ, so long as m grows at most polynomially in n, the number of
required messages is bounded by a constant. Further, for reasonable parameter values, k is much less
than 80 and, asymptotically, if m = O(n2−ǫ) it converges to 3.
4 The proof
In this section we give our full proof of Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1. We start, in Section 4.1, by
proving the Theorem assuming the Lemmas that are proved in Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4. Finally in
Section 4.5 we prove the Corollary.
4.1 Proof Outline
The following proof is of Theorem 3.1. In this proof we will provide forward references to the required
lemmas which are then proved in the rest of this section.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Lemma 4.3 in Section 4.2 says that this protocol provides statistical security with
distance bounded by the following expression, which is given here in terms of an event E specified in
Section 4.2. √
mkn−1P[E]− 1
In Section 4.3 we define a distribution over multigraphs. Lemma 4.4 says that if G is drawn from this
distribution and C(G) is the number of connected component in G then,
P[E] ≤ m−knE[mC(G)] .
This expectation is then bounded in Lemma 4.5, which says that, if n ≥ 19, k ≥ 3 and m ≤ 1
2
(
n
e
)k−1
,
E[mC(G)] ≤ m+m2
(n
e
)1−k
.
Note that the condition required on m here is implied by
(k − 1)(log2(n)− log2(e))− log2(m)
2
≥ 1
and thus follows from the condition in the theorem that σ ≥ 1.
Putting this together we get average case statistical security less than or equal to
√
m(e/n)k−1. Thus
we have average case statistical security 2−σ for
σ =
(k − 1)(log2(n)− log2(e))− log2(m)
2
.
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4.2 Reduction to a single input and shuffling step
To analyze the average-case statistical security of V we start by upper bounding the expected total
variation distance between the outputs of two executions with random inputs by a function of single
random input.
Lemma 4.1. Let Vk,n and V ′k,n denote two independent executions of the k-parallel IKOS protocol. Then
we have:
E~X,~X′[TV|~X,~X′(Vk,n(~X),Vk,n(~X′))] ≤
√
mkn−1P[Vk,n(~X) = V ′k,n(~X)]− 1 .
Proof. We first remove the expectation over ~X′ by taking its randomness inside the total variation
distance (ie. switching from TV|~X,~X′ to TV|~X). Note that this is akin to a reverse Jensen inequality, and
therefore we will need to pay a factor of 2 to get the result via a triangle inequality. The formal bound
is obtained by taking ~X′′ to be an independent copy of ~X′ and observing that
E~X,~X′[TV|~X,~X′(V(~X),V(~X′))] ≤ E~X,~X′[TV|~X,~X′(V(~X),V(~X′′)) + TV|~X,~X′(V(~X′′),V(~X′))]
= E~X[TV|~X(V(~X),V(~X′′))] + E ~X′ [TV|~X′(V(~X′′),V(~X′))]
= 2E~X[TV|~X(V(~X),V(~X′))] .
Next we observe that ~V = V(~X′) has uniform distribution over the tuples in Gkn that add up to∑
i Xi. We use this information to expand the total variation and write it as an expectation over
~V as
follows:
2TV|~X(V(~X),V(~X′)) = 2TV|~X(V(~X), ~V)
=
∑
~v∈Gkn
|P|~X[V(~X) = ~v]− P[~V = ~v]|
=
∑
~v∈Gkn:
∑
~v=
∑ ~X
|P|~X[V(~X) = ~v]−m1−kn|
= mkn−1E~V[|P|~X,~V[V(~X) = ~V]−m1−kn|] .
The final task is to bound the remaining expectation. We start by defining the random variable Z =
Z(~X, ~V) := P|~X,~V[V(~X) = ~V]. Note that because both V(~X) and ~V follow the same uniform distribution
over tuples in Gkn conditioned to having the same sum, we have
E~X,~V[Z] = P[V(~X) = ~V] = m1−kn .
Therefore, the expectation that we need to bound takes the simple form E[|Z − E[Z]|], and can be
bounded in terms of E[Z2] via Jensen’s inequality:
E[|Z− E[Z]|] ≤
√
V[Z] =
√
E[Z2]− E[Z]2 .
Now recall that if A,A′ ∈ A are i.i.d. random variables, then we have
P[A = A′] =
∑
a∈A
P[A = a]2 .
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Using this identity we can write the expectation of Z2 over the randomness in ~V in terms of the probability
that two independent executions of V(~X) (conditioned on ~X) yield the same result:
E~V[Z
2] = m1−kn
∑
~v∈Gkn:
∑
~v=
∑ ~X
P|~X[V(~X) = ~v]2
= m1−knP|~X[V(~X) = V ′(~X)] .
Putting the pieces together completes the proof:
E~X,~X′[TV|~X,~X′(V(~X),V(~X′))] ≤ 2E~X[TV|~X(V(~X),V(~X′))]
≤ mkn−1E~X,~V[|P|~X,~V[V(~X) = ~V]−m1−kn|]
≤
√
mkn−1P[V(~X) = V ′(~X)]− 1 .
To further simplify the bound in previous lemma we can write the probability P[Vk,n(~X) = V ′k,n(~X)]
in terms of a single permutation step. For that purpose we introduce the notation Vk,n = Sk,n ◦ ~Rk,n,
where:
• ~Rk,n : Gn → Gnk is the randomized map that given ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) generates the shares
(Y
(1)
i , . . . ,Y
(k)
i ) = R(xi) and arranges them in order first by share id and then by user:
~Rk,n(~x) = (Y(1)1 , . . . ,Y(1)n , . . . ,Y(k)1 , . . . ,Y(k)n ) .
• Sk,n : Gnk → Gnk is a random permutation of its inputs obtained by applying k independent
shufflers S(j), j ∈ [k], to the inputs in blocks of n:
Sk,n(y(1)1 , . . . , y(1)n , . . . , y(k)1 , . . . , y(k)n ) = (S(1)(y(1)1 , . . . , y(1)n ) · · · S(k)(y(k)1 , . . . , y(k)n ))
It is important to note that Sk,n produces random permutations of [kn] which are uniformly distributed
in the subgroup of all permutations which arise as the parallel composition of k uniform permutations
on [n]. Equipped with these observations, it is straightforward to verify the following identity.
Lemma 4.2. Let ~Rk,n and ~R′k,n denote two independent executions of the additive sharing step in
Vk,n(~X) = Sk,n ◦ ~Rk,n. Then we have
P[Vk,n(~X) = V ′k,n(~X)] = P[ ~Rk,n(~X) = Sk,n ◦ ~R′k,n(~X)] .
Proof. We drop all subscripts for convenience. The result follows directly from the fact that S is
uniform over a subgroup of permutations, which implies that the inverse of S and the composition of
two independent copies of S both follow the same distribution as S. Thus, we can write:
P[V(~X) = V ′(~X)] = P[S ◦ ~R(~X) = S ′ ◦ ~R′(~X)]
= P[ ~R(~X) = S−1 ◦ S ′ ◦ ~R′(~X)]
= P[ ~R(~X) = S ◦ ~R′(~X)] .
Putting these two lemmas together yields the following bound.
Lemma 4.3. Let Vk,n and V ′k,n denote two independent executions of the k-parallel IKOS protocol. Then
we have:
E~X,~X′[TV|~X,~X′(Vk,n(~X),Vk,n(~X′))] ≤
√
mkn−1P[ ~Rk,n(~X) = Sk,n ◦ ~R′k,n(~X)]− 1 .
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4.3 Reduction to a problem on random graphs
Definition 4.1. A random n-vertex 2k-regular multigraph G is from the unconditioned permutation
model, denoted R∗(n, 2k), if it can be constructed as follows. Start with n vertices and no edges. Take
a set of k uniformly random and independent permutations of the vertices, denoted {πi}ki=1. For each
vertex v and each index i ∈ [k], add an edge between v and πi(v). We say that G is generated by {πi}ki=1.
Note that G may have self-loops. Let C(G) be number of connected components of a graph G.
Lemma 4.4. Let G be drawn from R∗(n, 2k), then
P[ ~R(~X) = S ◦ ~R′(~X)] ≤ E[mC(G)−kn]
Proof. Note that, by the tower law,
P[ ~R(~X) = S ◦ ~R′(~X)] = E[P[ ~R(~X) = S ◦ ~R′(~X)|S]].
Let GS be the unconditioned permutation model graph, with vertex set [n], generated by the k permu-
tations used in S. Note that, it suffices to show that
P[ ~R(~X) = S ◦ ~R′(~X)|S] = mC(GS )−kn.
For notational convenience, we will define a deterministic reordering of ~R(~X) and S◦ ~R′(~X) as follows.
Consider the permutation P : [kn] → [kn]
P (j) =
⌊
j − 1
k
⌋
+ n(j − 1 mod k) + 1.
Define U,U′ ∈ Gkn by Uj = ~R(~X)P (j) and U′j = P ◦S ◦ ~R′(~X)P (j). Note that P is such that the shares
from each input are grouped together (in order) in U. Consequently, U′ groups together collections of k
shares, one from the output of each shuffler. Thus it suffices to show that
P[U = U′|S] = mC(GS)−kn.
For j ∈ [kn], let Aj be the event that Uj = U′j . Now define pj := P[Aj |A1, ..., Aj−1,S], thus
P[U = U′|S] =
kn∏
j=1
pj .
First we consider values of j that are not divisible by k, i.e. they are not the final share in a group
of k. For such a j, we claim pj = m
−1. To see this, condition on ~X and ~R′, in addition to A1, ..., Aj−1.
Note that Uj and Uj+1 only depend upon anything we’ve conditioned on via their sum. Therefore Uj is
still uniformly distributed and has probability m−1 of being equal to U′j .
For an index i ∈ [kn] we define the vertex corresponding to i to be the vertex ⌈i/k⌉, and we define Ci
to be the set of vertices in the same connected component as this vertex in GS . For the remaining j’s,
we distinguish the case where the corresponding vertex is the highest index in Cj and the case where it
isn’t.
In the first case, ∑
i s.t. Ci=Cj
U
′
i =
∑
i s.t. Ci=Cj
~R′(~X)P (i)
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as the sums have the same summands in a different order. Further,∑
i s.t. Ci=Cj
~R′(~X)P (i) =
∑
i s.t. Ci=Cj
Ui
as they both represent sharings of the same input values and∑
i s.t. Ci=Cj
i 6=j
U
′
i =
∑
i s.t. Ci=Cj
i 6=j
Ui
as we are conditioning on A1, ..., Aj−1. Putting these together we can conclude that pj = 1.
For the second case, we will find that pj = m
−1. We will show this by showing that if we condition
on the value of Uj then U
′
j is still uniformly distributed. That is to say that the number of possible
outcomes fitting those conditions with each value of Uj is independent of that value. To show that these
sets of outcomes have the same size we will partition the possible outcomes into sets of size m, with U′j
taking each value in G exactly once in each set. This will be possible because the structure of GS allows
us to change the value of U′j and other values to preserve what is being conditioned on in an algebraically
principled way. If G = Zm, for some prime m, i.e. the set of possible outcomes forms a vector space,
this can be thought of as follows. The space of possible outcomes consitent with the conditions is a
subspace of the space of all outcomes. Thus showing that this subspace contains two possible values for
U
′
j suffices by the nice algebraic properties of vector spaces. That there is more than one possible value
of U′j is a consequence of GS “connecting the jth share to later shares”. The following paragraphs make
this formal in the more general setting of any abelian group G.
Consider the set T of choices of (U · U′) ∈ G2kn that are consistent with A1, ..., Aj−1 (and a value
of ~X). We consider the group action of G2kn on itself by addition. We will show that, there exists a
homomorphism G → G2kn mapping g to ug with the following property. The action of ug on G2kn fixes
T and Uj and adds g to U′j. Therefore, the equivalence relation, of being equal upto adding ug for some
g, partitions T into subsets of size m each containing one value for which Aj holds. It follows, from the
fact that each entry in T is equally likely, that pj = m−1.
To find such a homomorphism, note that there is a path in GS from the vertex corresponding
to the jth share to a higher index vertex. This is equivalent to saying that there is a sequence
(a1, b1, a2, b2, ..., al, bl, al+1) with the following properties. The ai and bi are elements of [kn] and should
be interpreted as indexes of Gkn. For all i ∈ [l], π(bi) = ai and bi and ai+1 correspond to the same
vertex. We have a1 = j, bl > j, ai 6= ai′ for any i 6= i′, and bi < j for all i < l. Let ug be the element of
G2kn with a g in entries a2, ..., al+1, b1 + kn, ..., bl + kn and the identity everywhere else.
Adding ug doesn’t change the truth of A1, ..., Aj−1 because Uai and U
′
ai
= ~R′(~X)bi are always incre-
mented together, with the exception of when i = 1 or l+1 which is fine because then ai ≥ j. In the case
of i = 1 this adds g to U′j without changing Uj . The consistency of the implied values of
~X is maintained
because Uai and
~R′(~X)P (bi−1) are always incremented together and affect the ~X implied by U the same
as that implied by ~R′(~X). Thus, this ug has the properties we claimed and pj = m−1.
Tying this together we have that
P[U = U′] = E[P[U = U′|S]]
= E[
kn∏
j=1
pj]
= E[mC(GS)−kn]
= E[mC(G)−kn] .
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4.4 Understanding the number of connected components of G
Lemma 4.5. Let n ≥ 19, k ≥ 3 and m ≤ 1
2
(
n
e
)k−1
. Let G be drawn from R∗(n, 2k), then
P(C(G) = c) ≤ 1.5
c−1
c!
( e
n
)(k−1)(c−1)
.
Therefore,
E[mC(G)] ≤ m+m2
(n
e
)1−k
.
Proof. Let p(n, c) = P[C(Gn) = c], we will show that the bound in the theorem holds by induction on
c. For c = 1 the bound is trivial as the right hand side equals 1. For c > 1,
p(n, c) =
1
c
∑
S⊂[n]
P[No edge from S to [n]− S]p(|S|, 1)p(n− |S|, c− 1)
=
1
c
n−c+1∑
s=1
(
n
s
)(
n
s
)−k
p(s, 1)p(n− s, c− 1).
We now bound this expression, using the induction hypothesis, to find that
p(n, c) ≤ 1
c
n−c+1∑
s=1
(
n
s
)1−k
1.5c−2
(c− 1)!
(
e
n− s
)(k−1)(c−2)
(5)
=
1.5c−1
c!
( e
n
)(k−1)(c−1) 2e1−k
3
n−c+1∑
s=1
(
(n− s)!s!nc−1
n!(n− s)c−2
)k−1
. (6)
To complete the proof it suffices to show that this sum on the right is at most 1.5ek−1. Call the sth
summand from this sum as. We separate the summands into three cases, depending on whether s is
greater than n/10 and/or less than 3n/4. Firsty, if s ≤ n/10, then
as
as−1
=
(
s
n− s+ 1
(
n− s+ 1
n− s
)c−2)k−1
≤
(
s
n− se
c−2
n−s
)k−1
≤
(
e
10
9
9
)2
≤ 1
8
.
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Thus we can bound the early summands with a geometric series as follows.
⌊n/10⌋∑
s=1
as ≤
⌊(n−c)/10⌋∑
s=1
a1
8s−1
≤
∞∑
s=1
a1
8s−1
≤ 8a1
7
=
8
7
(
n
n− 1
)(c−2)(k−1)
≤ 8
7
e
(c−1)(k−1)
n ≤ 8
7
e(k−1)
We now similarly consider the terms with s ≥ 3n/4. For these values of s,
as+1
as
=
(
s+ 1
n− s
(
n− s
n− s− 1
)c−2)k−1
≥
(
s
n− s
)k−2
≥ 9
If c > n/4 then there are no summands for s ≥ 3n/4. Otherwise we can bound the late summands with
a geometric series as follows.
n−c+1∑
s=⌈3n/4⌉
as ≤
n−c+1∑
s=⌈3n/4⌉
an−c+1
9n−c+1−s
≤
n−c+1∑
s=−∞
an−c+1
9n−c+1−s
=
9an−c+1
8
=
9
8
(
(c− 1)!nc−1(n− c+ 1)!
n!(c− 1)c−2
)k−1
.
Applying Sterling’s bound,
√
2πnn+
1
2 e−n ≤ n! ≤ enn+ 12 e−n, to the factorials in the above expression
bounds it above by,
9
8
(
e2√
2π
(c− 1)1.5
(
1− c− 1
n
)n−c+1.5)k−1
.
As n ≥ 19 and c ≤ n/4, this is maximised for c = 3, and as we also have k ≥ 3 this results in the bound
9
8
(
e2√
2π
2
√
2(1− 2
n
)n−1.5
)k−1
≤ (1.27)k−1 .
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Finally we consider the case of n/10 < s < 3n/4. Let α = s/n. Substituting this into as gives(
((1− α)n)!(αn)!
(n− 1)!(1− α)c−2
)k−1
.
Applying Sterling’s bound again bounds this expression by
(
e2√
2π
√
n(1− α)2.5−c+(1−α)nααn+ 12
)k−1
≤
(
e2
√
n√
2π
ααn
)k−1
.
Where the inequality holds because (1 − α) ≤ 1 and, for any summand that appears in the sum,
2.5 − c + (1 − α)n > 0. The final expression is maximised for α = 3/4 and there are fewer than 3n/5
summands with n/10 < s < 3n/4. Therefore the sum of all of these terms can be bounded by,
3n
5
(
e2
√
n√
2π
(
3
4
) 3n
4
)k−1
≤
(
en
(
3
4
) 3n
4
)k−1
≤ 1.
Where we have used that k ≥ 3 and n ≥ 19. Adding these up the sum as a whole is bounded by
8
7
ek−1 + 1 + (1.27)k−1 < 1.5ek−1.
To conclude the proof we consider the expectation. Below we apply the definition of expectation with
the bound on the probability above.
E[mC(G)] ≤
n∑
c=1
mc
1.5c−1
c!
( e
n
)(k−1)(c−1)
Notice that every term after the second is at most me
k−1
2nk−1
times the previous term, thus
E[mC(G)] ≤ m+ 3m
2
4
(n
e
)1−k ∞∑
i=0
(
mek−1
2nk−1
)i
Then using that m ≤ 1
2
(
n
e
)k−1
we bound the sum by 4/3 to find
E[mC(G)] ≤ m+m2
(n
e
)1−k
.
4.5 Reduction to random inputs
Finally, we prove Corollary 3.1 from Theorem 3.1 by showing that a certain level of average-case security
with k messages implies the same level of worst-case security with k+1 messages. In addition, we show
that the additional message required to reduce worst-case security to average-case security does not need
to be sent through a shuffler. Note that the expression for the required k in Corollary 3.1 is a simple
rearrangement of the expression for σ, so the following lemma is all that remains to be proven.
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Lemma 4.6. If Vk,n provides average-case statistical security with parameter σ, then Vk+1,n and V˜k,n
provide worst-case statistical security with parameter σ.
Proof. Fix a pair of inputs ~x and ~x′ with the same sum. Since the output of Vk+1,n(~x) can be simulated
directly from the output of V˜k,n(~x) by applying a random permutation to the last n elements, we have
TV(Vk+1,n(~x),Vk+1,n(~x′)) ≤ TV(V˜k,n(~x), V˜k,n(~x′)), and therefore it suffices to show that V˜k,n provides
worst-case statistical security with parameter σ.
The key observation that allows us to reduce the worst-case security of V˜k,n to the average-case
security of Vk,n(~x) is to observe that the addition of an extra share can be interpreted as adding a
random value to each user’s input, effectively making the inputs uniformly random. To formalize this
intuition we observe that Rk admits a recursive decomposition as follows. Let U ∈ G be a uniformly
random group element and x ∈ G. Then we have R1(x) = x and, for k ≥ 1,
Rk+1(x) = (Rk(x− U),U) . (7)
Expanding this identity into the definition of V˜ and writing ~U = (U1, . . . ,Un) for the uniform random
variables arising from applying the above expression for Rk+1 to the input from each user, we obtain
V˜k(~x) = (Vk(~x− ~U), ~U) . (8)
Note that here ~x − ~U is a uniform random vector in Gn. The result now follows from matching the
uniform randomness from ~U observed when executing the protocol with two inputs with the same sum:
TV(V˜k+1(~x), V˜k+1(~x′)) = TV((Vk(~x− ~U), ~U), (Vk(~x′ − ~U′), ~U′)) (9)
= E~U[TV|~U(Vk(~x− ~U),Vk(~x′ − ~U))] (10)
= E~X,~X′[TV|~X,~X′(Vk(~X),Vk(~X′))] , (11)
where ~X and ~X′ are tuples with n uniformly random group elements conditioned on
∑
i Xi =
∑
i X
′
i.
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